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Abstract: This paper intends to provide an analytical framework to interpret the dynamic nexus 
between China and the world order from the perspective of the neo-Gramscian international 
relations school. It supposes that the post-war world order is mainly shaped by and reflected in the 
architecture of international/global governance. This supposition is largely built on the conceptual 
nexus between global governance, hegemony, and world order. Then, through the lens of global 
governance, the paper contends that the post-war historical dynamics between China and the world 
order can be divided into three periods: first the period of hostility and rejection (1949-1971), 
second the period of acceptance and integration (1971-2008), and third the period of leadership 
and contribution (2008 up to now). On the basis of such chronology, the paper attempts to deliver 
a historical and holistic interpretation of China’s changing role in the post-war world order. By 
distinguishing the roles China played and is playing in different historical periods, and by 
elaborating this dynamic historical process through a holistic view, this paper concludes that China 
is currently serving as a proactive rule-shaper rather than a disruptive revisionist or a stubborn 
vindicator of the existing world order.  
Keywords: The rise of China, world order, global governance, Neo-Gramscian international 
relations school 
Introduction 
The rise of China is widely recognized as one of the most significant phenomena in international 
relations in the beginning of the 21st century. During the last four decades, especially in the era of 
post financial crisis since 2008, China’s dramatic rise and its significance to the world economy 
can be observed from the following aspects: (1) in 2009, according to a statistic from the 
International Energy Agency, China became the world’s biggest energy user by consuming 2.252 
billion tons of oil equivalent, which exceeded the US’ 2.170 billion tons (Swartz & Oster, 2010); 
(2) in 2010, China replaced the United States as the largest manufacturing power (with a 18.9% 
share of world’s manufacturing activities) and continuously widened its lead in the consecutive 
years (Mechstroth, 2015); (3) in 2013, with its trade surplus rising by 12.8% to almost $260 billion, 
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China became the world’s largest trading nation by overtaking the US (Monaghan, 2014); (4) in 
2014, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated by using purchasing power parity, 
China became the world’s largest economy, worth $17.6 trillion compared to the US’ $17.4 trillion 
(Duncan & David, 2014); and (5) in 2015, the IMF added the Chinese Yuan to its Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) basket with the Yuan having a 10.9% weighting in the basket, which is just beneath 
than the US dollar’s 41.73% and the Euro’s 30.93% (Mayeda, 2015).  
The above achievements mainly resulted from Deng Xiaoping’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (东
ݹޫᲖ) strategy (keep a low profile and be self-restrained) which emphasizes China’s compliance 
with international rules and integration in the international system. Furthermore, with the 
increasing deficits of existing global governance and the rise of a large number of emerging powers, 
China is ushering in a historical opportunity to take more international responsibilities and 
participate in the rule-making process of international society in accord with China’s “You Suo 
Zuo Wei” (ᴹᡰ֌Ѫ) strategy (make a difference). 
China’s strategic transformation has been manifested in a series of proactive actions: (1) To 
consolidate the core position of the G20 in global economic governance, leading the G20 to 
become a long-term governance mechanism; (2) to establish the New Development Bank (BRICS’ 
Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), improving the pattern of global 
financial governance; (3) to propose the “Belt and Road Initiative”, constructing a broader 
framework for international cooperation; (4) to promote that the Paris climate agreement is reached, 
reflecting the responsible role of a great power; (5) to complete the construction of free trade areas, 
promoting regional economic integration; and (6) to openly defend globalization and the free 
market economy, etc. 
China’s practical foreign policy and its ambitious strategy to be a rule-maker rather than a 
rule-follower has triggered lots of debate with regard to a remarkable question – what sort of 
implications would be brought about by the rise of China to the existing world order? What role 
is China playing and what role will it play in the global governance structure? 
Power transition theory and offensive realism predict that the rise of China will bring 
instability to the existing world order. They argue that states are sensitive to their relative 
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capabilities and will seek to change the international order in ways that better reflect their newly 
earned power and national interests. When weak, they may reluctantly accept the constraints 
placed upon them, but once strong enough, they tend to wield their power to change the status quo 
(Gilpin, 1981; Measheimer, 2014; Organski & Kugler, 1981). Some even declare a new Cold War 
in which China replaces Russia, recalling that the New Middle Empire has sophisticated nuclear 
facilities, that it has the largest army in the world, and its budget for defense increases by 10% per 
year. Then, China is still, despite some recently discovered relative freedom, a totalitarian and so 
threatening power. In addition, China has problems with human rights, pointing out its many 
repressive actions, large internal cleavages, a severely altered natural environment, and a still 
incipient social security system. 
Liberalism and constructivism are confident that China will and can be socialized to conform 
to existing international rules, and consequently, a stronger China can make greater contributions 
and provide public goods. They point to the strength of international institutions and norms as 
sufficient constraints on rising powers such as China, which over time will change and adapt lest 
its aggressiveness invites counterforce and becomes detrimental to its own self-interests (Ikenberry, 
2012; Johnston, 2007). They believe that international institutions can help perpetuate US 
dominance. By strengthening these institutions, the United States can “lock in” the hegemonic 
order that it built after the Second World War and thereby ensure that it persists after unipolarity 
ends. 
However, this paper argues that the two mainstream international relations theories are only 
partly applicable to the analysis of the relationship between China and the world order. In other 
words, each of them did have strong explanatory power for a particular historical period 
respectively, but both of them lack of a historical and relational interpretation of the contemporary 
interaction and historical dynamics between the two. As a consequence, the paper intends to 
provide a theoretical framework on the basis of the core concepts and notions of neo-Gramscian 
international relations school, to interpret the dynamic nexus between China and world order since 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The historical and relational 
interpretation of this paper would provide an alternative perspective for understanding the rise of 
China and its impacts on the existing world order. 
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Methodological Consideration: Neo-Gramscian School 
It is unquestionable that US academia has, so far, dominated the development of international 
relations theory. Perhaps for ideological reasons, although Marxist scholars did not lack 
international relations theory, they were excluded from the debate dominated by the mainstream 
international relations theories. Before the 1970s, Marxist international relations theory mainly 
explored the capitalist financial empire, dependency and the world system, lacking dialogue with 
mainstream international relations theory. Since the 1970s, with the rise of international political 
economy, Marxist thoughts and ideas concerning international affairs have been recognized as a 
significant source for international relations theory. Among these thoughts, the neo-Gramscian 
school has received the most attention. 
The theoretical foundation of the neo-Gramscian school was rooted in the political theory of 
the Italian left-wing thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), whose thinking was widely applied in 
post-war social science research. Robert W. Cox, from York University, Canada, further applied 
Gramsci’s ideas to international relations. Other scholars, such as Stephen Gill, Andreas Bieler, 
Kees van der Pijl, and Mark Rupert, also adopted Gramsci's views and used them to study the 
phenomena of regionalization and globalization. These international relations scholars are called 
the neo-Gramscian school or the Italian school. 
The neo-Gramscian school intends to integrate multiple research levels, including the 
national level and social level, political level and economic level, and international level and 
domestic level, etc. By so doing, it attempts to provide another perspective for international 
relations theory. In order to achieve its theoretical purpose, Cox introduced a method of historical 
structure, from the dialectical relationship among three elements of ideas, material capabilities, 
and institutions, to analyze society, state, and world. With the development of international 
political economy, increasing numbers of scholars attach importance to the influence of 
transnational actors on international relations. In the meantime, the method of historical structure 
also meets the theoretical requirement of political and economic integration. Moreover, since the 
1970s, mainstream international relations theory and international political economy have been 
heatedly discussing related issues regarding the American hegemonic persistence and post-
hegemonic order. Against this background, the neo-Gramscian school's unique view of hegemony 
and the world order has contributed a lot to the diversity of international relations theory. 
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In 1981 and 1983, Robert W. Cox published two influential articles in Millennium, which 
laid the foundation for the neo-Gramsican international relations school. According to Cox, neo-
Gramscian international relations theory consists of a number of key concepts and notions, such 
as hegemony, war of maneuver, war of position, passive revolution, and historical bloc, etc. 
Through these two articles, Cox not only made a huge contribution to raising the concept of 
hegemony from the national level to the international level, but also he developed a method of 
historical structures (Cox, 1981) which he defined as,  
A picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine 
actions in any direct mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. 
Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but 
they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing 
historical structure, they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging 
configuration of forces, a rival structure (Cox, 1981: 135). 
In order to make the method of historical structures intelligible and applicable, Cox 
introduced three categories of forces interacting reciprocally in this structure. These forces are 
material capabilities, institutions, and ideas. To be specific, material capabilities refer to the 
productive and destructive potentials which are expressed in dynamic form and accumulated forms; 
ideas consist of two kinds, while the intersubjective meaning indicates the shared notions of the 
nature of social relations throughout a particular historical structure, the collective images implies 
several - even opposing - views regarding the legitimacy of existing power relations and the 
meanings of justice, etc.; institutions, in Cox’s viewpoint, is a means of stabilizing and perpetuating 
a particular order. Institutions do not only reflect the established and emerging power relations, but 
they also can promote collective images in line with these power relations. 
Furthermore, according to Cox, the method of historical structures is applied on three levels 
– social forces, forms of state, and world orders – which are interrelated. Each of the three levels 
can be regarded as containing and bearing the impact of the others, and the relationship among 
them is not simply unilineal (Cox, 1981). Based on Cox’s method of historical structures, Stephen 
Gill has generated a detailed interpretation of a historical bloc as follows, 
An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence between material forces, 
institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically 
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organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence 
to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders 
must engage in ‘conscious, planned struggle’. Any new historical bloc must have not 
only power within the civil society and economy, it also needs persuasive ideas, 
arguments and initiatives that build on, catalyze and develop its political networks and 
organization – not political parties such (Gill, 2003: 58). 
The formulation of a new historical bloc is not an easy project, as Cox argued, ‘only a war of 
position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes, and a war of position involves building 
up the socio-political base for change through the creation of new historical blocs’ (Cox, 1983: 
173-174). On the national level, Gramsci made a comparison between the war of maneuver and 
war of position regarding their role in countering the existing hegemon and establishing a new 
historical bloc, and he pointed out that ‘the war of maneuver is the phase of open conflict between 
classes, where the outcome is decided by direct clashes between revolutionaries and the state. War 
of position, on the other hand, is the slow, hidden conflict, where forces seek to gain influence and 
power’ (McHugh, 2013). 
The war of position, in this paper, can be regarded as the movement towards the creation of 
a historical bloc. This movement has been divided by Gramsci (1989) into three levels. The first 
level is known as the economico-corporative, which denotes that the formulation of a particular 
group is based on specific interests; the second level is considered solidarity or class consciousness, 
which includes the whole social class but still purely focuses on economic issues; the third and top 
level is the hegemonic, which ‘brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of 
subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal 
terms’ (Cox, 1983: 168). 
In line with Gramsci’s clarification above, hegemony can be seen as the highest level of a 
historical bloc. Hegemony, according to Gramsci’s understanding and application, suggests ‘a 
societal acceptance of a large range of norms and rules ranging from mode of production to 
organizations, systems, regimes and social order’ (Li, 2016: 31). Furthermore, as Gramsci said, 
hegemony can be achieved through passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex 
superstructures, by which he means ‘passing from the specific interests of a group or class to the 
building of institutions and elaboration of ideologies’ (Cox, 1983). Thus, hegemony is attained by 
economic, political, and cultural leadership, leading to a broadly shared historical bloc. In other 
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words, a historical bloc, at this level, implies an alliance of a ‘coalition of social forces’ united 
under a common hegemonic project (Gramsci, 1971). 
However, last but not least, the movement towards a new historical bloc or a new hegemon 
would face its counterforce – passive revolution – from the established powers. According to 
Gramsci, the notion of passive revolution has two components, Caesarism and trasformismo. 
Caesarism refers to when ‘a strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate between equal and 
opposed social forces’ (Cox, 1983: 166), and trasformismo serves as ‘a strategy of assimilating 
and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant 
coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to establish 
social and political power’ (Cox, 1983: 166-167). 
Conceptual Nexus: Global Governance, Hegemony and World Order 
The concept of global governance was proposed against the background of interdependence and 
globalization in the post-Cold War era. However, it should be noted that existing global governance 
can be traced back to the post-war capitalist international order in which the then international 
governance emerged and developed. In other words, it can be argued that the post-war Western-
dominated international governance has laid the foundation for the contemporary architecture of 
global governance.  
In this paper, it is supposed that the changing world order in the post-war era has been mainly 
shaped by and reflected in the architecture of international/global governance. This supposition is 
largely built on the conceptual nexus of the three concepts – global governance, hegemony, and 
the world order – which is expected to be clarified. 
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Figure 1: The conceptual nexus among world order, hegemony and global governance 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
As a heatedly discussed academic topic over the last two decades, global governance has 
received exponentially increasing attention since the 1990s. Both the analytical unit and analytical 
level of global governance have broken the boundary of traditional international relations (IR) 
study. On the one hand, unlike in traditional IR, the state is not a single actor (analytical unit) in 
global governance any longer, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), multinational corporations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society are all beginning to play significant 
roles in influencing global issues and addressing global challenges; on the other hand, the rise of 
global governance can be regarded as a reflection towards and reconstruction of the traditional 
“levels of analysis” (individual – state – international system). This does not only imply that the 
state, as the centrality of global governance, is still considered as a core actor, but it also indicates 
that a higher level of global system (world order) and a lower level of domestic society (social 
force) should be taken into consideration and added as two complementary analytical levels in the 
study of global governance. 
Since it covers such a wide range of actors and issue areas, as mentioned above, global 
governance still does not have a universal definition. However, it would not obstruct IR and 
international political economy scholars to make their contributions to the intellectual edifice in 
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which the nature of global governance is being continuously explored. This paper has collected 
some of the representative definitions of global governance which could contribute to our 
understanding of the conceptual nexus among global governance, hegemony, and world order. 
Global governance, as Thomas G. Weiss argues, ‘is the combination of informal and formal 
values, rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies, and organizations of various types that often 
provide a surprising and desirable degree of global order, stability and predictability’ (Weiss, 2013: 
32). Raimo Vayrynen identifies global governance as ‘collective actions to establish international 
institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, 
transnational, or national problems’(Vayrynen, 1999: 25). 
Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst proposed their viewpoint of the pieces of global 
governance, which can be divided into six categories: (1) IGOs and NGOs; (2) international rules 
and laws, which includes more than 3,600 multilateral agreements, apart from numerous legal 
practices and opinions; (3) international norms or ‘soft law’ in the areas of human rights and 
environmental protections; (4) international regimes, that is, principles, norms, rules and decision-
making structures in specific issue areas; (5) ad hoc arrangements and groupings that do not have 
any legal basis, such as the G7/8 and G20, and global conferences or world summits; and (6) 
private governance, of which the most typical example is credit-rating agencies, such as Moody’s 
Investors Service (Karns & Mingst, 2015). 
In addition, according to Chan and Lee, ‘global governance concerns the issue of how the 
world is governed; that is, how global problems are handled and how global order and stability can 
be ensured, in the absence of an overarching central authority or world government to regulate’ 
(Chan & Lee, 2012: 5). 
From these definitions and interpretations, it can be found that institutions and ideas are two 
critical elements constituting global governance. In the meantime, as mentioned above, institutions 
and ideas are also regarded to be two major components of Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971). More important, the high relatedness between global governance and world order 
was emphasized by the above scholars in their definitions. 
Furthermore, based on an understanding of global governance, one of the breakthrough 
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points to establish the conceptual relationship between global governance and hegemony is 
international organizations. According to Cox (1983), international organizations can be regarded 
as the mechanisms of hegemony, 
One mechanism through which the universal norms of world hegemony are expressed 
is the international organization. Indeed, international organization functions as the 
process through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. 
Among the features of international organization which express its hegemonic role are 
the following: (1) the institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of 
hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world 
order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt 
the elites from peripheral countries; (5) they absorb counterhegemonic ideas (Cox, 
1983: 172). 
In Cox’s illustration, international organizations are not merely material entities which 
‘possess physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets’ (Young, 1989: 
32), they also contain norms, ideas, and rules of which their founding members are firmly in 
support. Moreover, the rules, ideas, and norms embedded in international organizations are closely 
associated with the issue of how international/global affairs should be dealt with and how the world 
should be governed. In this respect, it is not difficult to comprehend that whether international 
organization is effective or not as a mechanism of hegemony is largely connected to the rise and 
decline of global governance and the vicissitudes of world order. 
Therefore, if a state or a group of states intends to become a hegemon or a historical bloc, 
the state or the group of states would have to establish and defend a world order which can be 
universal in conception, i.e., ‘not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order 
which most other states could find compatible with their interests’ (Cox, 1983). 
Last but not least, at the end of this section, it is necessary to point out three different but 
overlapping ways of understanding the world order, developed by Steen Fryba Christensen and Li 
Xing: world disorder, world new order, and world re-order. 
World disorder indicates the confrontations and clashes between existing powers and 
emerging powers. Because of their disagreements and conflicts of interest, the international 
regimes and existing structures are inclined to be disrupted; world re-order implies that the existing 
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order displays an ability for resilience by responding to altering environments in which a historical 
evolution from unipolarity to multipolarity is proceeding. This order will undertake a trasformismo 
process (one kind of passive revolution) in which the existing structure is trying to accommodate 
the new rising powers, and the essential features of the existing order are expected to be maintained; 
world new order, as the name implies, suggests that the world is to be shaped by a new order in 
which the existing and emerging powers will negotiate on new relationship terms shaped by new 
norms, rules and ideas, leading to a redefined new world order (Christensen & Li, 2016). 
Analysis: Historical Dynamics between China and Global Governance 
The paper attempts to deliver a historical and holistic interpretation of China’s changing role in the 
post-war world order since the establishment of the PRC. On the basis of the conceptual nexus 
built in the last section, these historical dynamics between China and the world order will be 
interpreted and analyzed through the lens of international/global governance. Moreover, by 
applying the method of historical structure developed by Cox, China’s roles in international/global 
governance will be discussed through investigating the three interrelated and reciprocal elements: 
material capabilities, institutions, and ideations. The historical process is divided into three periods: 
the period of hostility and rejection (1949-1971), the period of acceptance and integration (1971-
2008), and the period of leadership and contribution (2008 up to now). This division is mainly 
based on three significant historical events: the outbreak of the Cold War, Ping-pong diplomacy2, 
and the spread of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
Time phase 
 
 
China and 
international/ 
global governance 
The period of 
hostility and 
rejection (1949-
1971) 
The period of 
acceptance and 
integration (1971-
2008) 
The period of 
leadership and 
contribution 
(2008 up to now) 

2 “Ping-pong diplomacy” (⃡⃢⮥ℳ) refers to the exchange of table tennis (ping-pong) players 
between the United States and the PRC in the early 1970s. The event marked a thaw in Sino-
American relations that paved the way for a visit to Beijing by President Richard Nixon. 
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Strategic choice 
Radical anti-
hegemonic strategy 
by means of the war 
of maneuver 
“Tao Guang Yang 
Hui”, move with the 
passive revolution 
from hegemony 
“You Suo Zuo Wei”, 
Counter-hegemony 
through war of 
position 
Material capabilities 
China was a middle 
power between the 
two superpowers, the 
US and the USSR 
China was a 
subordinated state 
under the US-
dominated 
hegemony 
China is the second 
largest economy in 
the world 
Ideas 
World Revolution, 
anti-imperialism, 
anti-revisionism 
“Three World 
Theory”, “Reform 
and Opening-up”, 
accept and comply 
with Western ideas 
and norms 
“Wide consultation, 
joint contribution 
and shared benefits”, 
contribute new ideas 
Institutions 
Criticized and 
resisted Western-
based international 
institutions 
Active engagement 
and cooperation with 
Western-led 
institutions 
Initiated new China-
led institutions, such 
as the AIIB and the 
NDB 
The direction of 
world order 
World disorder World re-order 
Between world re-
order and world new 
order 
Table 1: Historical dynamics between China and international/global governance 
Source: Author’s compilation 
The period of hostility and rejection (1949-1971) 
The outbreak of the Cold War in 1940s split the world into two historical blocs: the Western-
dominant capitalist international system and the USSR socialist international system. 
Contemporary global governance can be traced back to the then Western-led international 
governance, which is also widely recognized as the “post-war international order”. Post-war 
Western-based international governance is built upon three significant pillars. They are: the 
political pillar, the United Nations; the economic pillar, the Bretton Woods System; and the 
security pillar, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
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In accordance with the changing international situation, this period can further be divided 
into two subphases, the subphase of “Leaning to One Side” (1949-1960) and the subphase of “Two 
Fronts” (1960-1971). In this period, generally speaking, China maintained an attitude of hostility 
and rejection towards and adopted an anti-hegemonic strategy against the then Western-dominated 
international governance, through the means of the war of maneuver.  
In terms of material capabilities, after the Second World War, although China was struggling 
to transform itself from a backward agricultural country to an industrial country, it had vast land, 
a large population, and great economic and military potential, and its high political status as the 
second largest socialist country made China an indispensable power between the two superpowers. 
In this first subphase (1949-1960), the United States did not give up its recognition of the fugitive 
Chiang Kai-shek regime, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the new Chinese government and 
obstructing China to replace the Kuomintang government in the United Nations and other 
international organizations. Thus, for its national security and ideology, the US was regarded as 
the main threat by China. In the second subphase (1960-1971), around the late 1950s and early 
1960s, relations between China and the USSR began to deteriorate and finally relations changed 
from being allies into being enemies. In the meantime, the US’ hostility towards China not only 
changed, but also intensified. The main idea of the Kennedy administration was that China was 
more “aggressive” than the Soviet Union and was more threatening. Thus, on the issue of China, 
the two superpowers formed somewhat of a consensus, and in some areas, they even dealt jointly 
with China.  
With regard to ideas, Mao Zedong, the then Chinese president, proposed that China should 
assume a responsibility for world revolution on the international level. This corresponded to Mao’s 
idea of persisting in the revolution on the domestic level, such as the “Three Great Remould”3 

3 The “Three Great Remould” (ₘ⮶㟈抯) refers to the socialist remould of the ownership of the 
means of production by the Chinese government from 1952 to 1956. This included the socialist 
remould of agriculture, the handicraft industry, and the capitalist industrial and commercial sectors. 
The purpose was to change the nature of production relations. At the end of 1956, the three major 
remoulds were basically completed, which signaled that China had entered the primary stage of 
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from 1952-1956. After the complete split between China and the Soviet Union in 1962 under the 
strategic guidance of the “Two Fronts”, Mao Zedong made it clear that the struggle against 
imperialism and revisionism were China's primary task. He believed that, within 50 years to 100 
years, it would be a great time for the complete transformation of the social system in the world 
(Zhou, 2009). In 1965, “People's Daily” put forward the slogan of “continued revolution”. Under 
the guidance of the idea of supporting world revolution, China was not only a major supporter of 
the armed struggle led by revolutionary parties in Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam, etc.; it was also the major source of foreign aid to Third World countries. 
In 1973, the amount of China’s foreign aid hit a historical high, accounting for 2.05 percent of its 
Gross National Product (GNP) for that year (Zhang, 2012). The theoretical and practical 
experience of China-promoted world revolution can be regarded as the war of maneuver adopted 
by China as a radical anti-hegemonic strategy. 
With reference to institutions, since the founding of ‘New China’, due to its ideological 
opposition, China, for a long period, was excluded from the international governance system under 
the US’ policy of isolation and blockade. Coupled with Taiwan’s long-term occupation of a United 
Nations seat supported by the United States, China was isolated from almost all of the critical 
international organizations before its restoration of its legitimate UN seat. In addition, another 
reason for this isolation was China’s adherence to the principles of independent foreign policy and 
non-interference, which made China fear interference from Western international organizations. In 
the meanwhile, in line with Mao Zedong’s ideas of world revolution, China perceived Western-led 
international organizations – the main components of post-war international governance – as the 
political and economic tools of Western imperialism to interfere in the sovereignty and internal 
affairs of other countries. For example, China considered the United Nations as the US’ voting 
machine.  
In sum, in this period, it can be observed that the relationship between China and the 
Western-based international governance was mutual hostility and mutual rejection. China’s foreign 
policy of “Leaning to one side” and “Two Fronts”, its ideas of world revolution, and its strong 

socialism. The socialist system (economic aspect) was basically established in China. 
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critiques of Western-dominated international organizations together reflect China’s anti-
hegemonic view by means of the war of maneuver. Therefore, China’s role in the then international 
governance can be considered to be that of a “system revisionist”. 
The period of acceptance and integration (1971-2008) 
In the second period (1971-2008), China not only began to accept and recognize Western-based 
international/global governance, but it was also integrated into and benefitted a lot from this system. 
Like the last period, this period was also further divided into two subphases, one marked by the 
event of “Ping-pong diplomacy” in 1971; and the other signaled by the launch of China’s “Reform 
and Opening-up Policy” in 1978. 
With regard to material capabilities, in the first subphase (1971-1978), with the further 
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations especially after the Sino-Soviet border armed conflict in 
1969, Chinese leaders recognized that the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to China than the 
United States. Against this background, “Ping-pong diplomacy” contributed a lot to the lessened 
tensions between the US and China, opening the door for then US’ President Nixon’s visit to China 
in 1972 (Andrews, 2016). Nixon’s visit promoted reconciliation between the US and China, and 
realized cooperation between the two states to jointly suppress the Soviet Union (Zhang, 1997). 
This reconciliation finally led to the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1979, which 
changed the landscape of world power relations. The second subphase (1978-2008) witnessed the 
dramatic rise of China during those three decades, averaging 9-10 percent real growth per year. In 
this subphase, China lifted 400 million people out of poverty, which was claimed as 
“unprecedented in human history” by the World Bank. More significant, China has been the engine 
for East Asian and global economic growth (Li, 2010). 
In terms of ideas, in the first subphase (1971-1978), the “Three World Theory” - proposed 
by Mao Zedong in 1974 - was built on his arguments of “One Intermediate Zone” (1954) and “Two 
Intermediate Zones” (1963). Mao contended that the division of three worlds was based on two 
indicators, one being national capacity and the other being ideology and social institutions. 
According to the “Three World Theory”, two superpowers, the US and the USSR, belonged to the 
First World; the intermediate section, including Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada, is the 
Second World; and Asia (except Japan), Africa, and Latin America belong to the Third World. 
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Under the guidance of the “Three World Theory”, in order to achieve its target of opposing the 
hegemony of the USSR, China can change its policy towards the US from war and confrontation 
into dialogue and cooperation, and China can create foreign policy by crossing social, institutional, 
and cultural differences so as to establish a broad united front including the Second World and the 
Third World (Jiang, 2012). Compared to the radical strategy – world revolution – in the first period, 
the establishment of a broad united front can be considered as a relatively moderate and circuitous 
counterhegemonic strategy, coined the war of position.  
In the second subphase, the main idea of China’s grand strategy was the “Reform and 
Opening-up” which contributed tremendously to the rise of China. It contends that the proposition 
of “Reform and Opening-up” was based on two considerations of the then Chinese leadership. One 
was to realize domestic development and economic modernization, which could deal with the crisis 
of legitimacy faced by the second generation of leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping after Mao's 
(the first generation of leadership) economic and political chaos in his late years. The other was to 
improve China’s international image and reputation (Johnston, 2001), especially after China’s long 
isolation from the system of international governance. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
Deng Xiaoping proposed another idea of “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (东ݹޫᲖ), implying that China 
should keep a low profile and be self-restrained. China would not seek hegemony or take the lead. 
Therefore, in this subphase, in line with the ideas of “Reform and Opening-up” and “Tao Guang 
Yang Hui”, and because of its national interest and the pressure from international society, China 
was gradually accepting and complying with some of the ideas and norms embedded in the 
Western-led international order.  
Regarding institutions, in the first subphase (1971-1978), with the transfer of the UN seat 
from Taiwan to the PRC in 1971, China began to establish or resume limited cooperation with 
certain international organizations. China established contacts with the subsidiary bodies of the 
United Nations and participated in its activities. For instance, in 1972, China participated in the 
official activities of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment 
Program, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, etc. In November 1973, the Chinese delegation attended 
the 17th session of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s conference and was elected a member. 
At the same time, China also established contact with a number of regional organizations. For 
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example, in May 1975, the European Community issued a statement recognizing the People's 
Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China, and establishing a formal 
diplomatic relations with China through negotiations. In addition, China also resumed and 
developed relations with international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the International Commission on Dams, the International 
Association of Geodesy and Geophysics, the International Organization for Standardization, the 
International Olympic Committee, the Asian Sports Federation, and the African Union of Trade 
Unions, etc. During this period, the number of international organizations China participated in 
increased from 1 in 1966 to 21 in 1977 (Wang & Tan, 2010). 
In the second subphase, since the beginning of Reform and Opening-up, China expanded 
and deepened its relationship with more major Western-dominated international organizations, 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and GATT (the predecessor of World Trade Organization (WTO)). 
On 17th April 1980, the IMF officially restored China's representation. In April 1980, Deng 
Xiaoping met with Robert Strange McNamara, the then president of the World Bank, explaining 
China's Reform and Opening-Up Policy, and welcomed the World Bank's cooperation with China. 
On May 12th of the same year, China officially resumed its legal seat in the World Bank. China 
and the World Bank have conducted fruitful cooperation in three areas: project loans, economic 
research, and technical assistance. In November 1982, the GATT granted China the status of 
observer state, by which China participated in the Uruguay Round of negotiations. After more than 
15 years of hard negotiations, China became a member of the WTO in 2001. This marks a new 
stage in the interaction between China and global economic governance, and it promotes the 
Chinese economy to share more convergence with the international/global economic system 
through institutional cooperation.  
Above all, in this period, the economic factors and international image were two important 
considerations for China's participation in international/global governance. Thus, it can be 
observed that, under Deng Xiaoping’s strategic guidance of “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (东ݹޫᲖ), 
China was moving away from passive revolution to the Western-led international system. China 
not only accepted and complied with Western-based ideas and institutions, but it also benefitted a 
lot from its integration in this system. One outstanding fact should be noted that, in 2005, Zoellick 
proposed that the United States step up efforts to make China a “responsible stakeholder” in the 
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international system (Xinhua, 2009). Throughout this period, China’s role in international/global 
governance was changing from the “system revisionist” to “system vindicator”.  
The period of leadership and contribution (2008 up to now) 
The beginning of the third period (2008 up to now) was marked by the event of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. In this period, China started to play a more proactive role in global governance, 
and showed its willingness to join and shape the architecture of global governance. The focus of 
China’s foreign policy is not confined to the calculations of pure economic gain and loss, but it is 
also expanding to the socio-political and superstructural domains. By so doing, China intends to 
obtain more structural power - which refers to “the power to choose and to shape the structures of 
the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic 
enterprises, and (not least) their professional people have to operate” (Strange, 1987: 565). 
With regard to material capabilities, the 2008 global financial crisis led to a revolutionary 
global power redistribution, with the dramatic rise of the emerging powers and the relative decline 
of the established powers. Among the emerging powers, China, as a developing country, has had 
a number of achievements. China became the world’s biggest energy user in 2009, it replaced the 
United States as the largest manufacturing power in 2010, and it became the world’s largest trading 
nation in 2013, etc. Moreover, it can be said that China has gained more technological and 
organizational capabilities than ever before. For instance, in the latest round of reform of the IMF 
and the World Bank, China’s voting share increased 3.143% and 1.64%, which was the highest 
compared to other countries. After this reform, China became the third most powerful member in 
both of the two existing international organizations. In addition, the Chinese Yuan was added to 
the IMF’s SDR basket in 2015, with the Yuan having a 10.9% weighting in the basket, which is 
just below that of the US dollar’s 41.73% and the Euro’s 30.93%. 
In terms of ideas, since China’s new leadership headed by Xi Jinping in 2012, China has, for 
the first time, put forward its overall idea of global governance, the principle of “wide consultation, 
joint contribution and shared benefits”. To be more specific, wide consultation refers to the 
brainstorming and discussion by all participants in global governance; joint contribution indicates 
all participants do their best to play to their respective advantages and potential to promote the 
construction of global governance; shared benefits means that the consequences of global 
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governance are more equitable to all participants (Xinhua, 2015). Moreover, China proposed a 
number of innovative ideas regarding different issue areas of global governance. For instance, the 
Belt and Road Initiative was proposed by China in order to promote regional development and 
integration in Asia; the proposal of the New Asian Security Concept indicates that China has great 
willingness to take solid steps to strengthen security dialogue and cooperation with other parties, 
and jointly explore the formulation of a code of conduct for regional security; by promoting the 
idea of the “Community of Common Destiny”, China is striving for developing a shared regional 
vision and trying to persuade other countries that their own peace and prosperity will best be 
secured by being more intertwined with that of China; and China’s proposition of the “New Type 
of Major Power Relations” can be considered as a strong response to the argument of “Thucydides’ 
Trap” in the era of globalization and interdependence. 
With reference to institutions, although China’s status in existing global governance has been 
relatively strengthened since the global financial crisis, its rights for speaking and making 
decisions are still not matched with its material capacities and its contributions to world 
development. As a result, China has begun to move from joining Western-dominated international 
organizations to struggling for more structural power through initiating several new international 
organizations. This transition can be regarded as a milestone of China’s dynamic role in global 
governance. One point should be noted: the China-led AIIB is the first multilateral development 
bank initiated by a developing country, which shows China’s determination to be a leader and rule-
maker in global governance. In addition, the New Development Bank was established by the 
BRICS in 2014, which was considered as a great achievement of this China-led trans-regional 
cooperative mechanism. Last but not least, China’s leaders have claimed several times, on different 
occasions, that China-led international institutions will play a complementary role in the existing 
global governance. 
In sum, in this period, it can be found that China is adopting a counter-hegemony strategy 
through its war of position which is a slow, hidden conflict where forces seek to gain influence and 
power. This can be seen to be manifested in China’s great willingness to lead and shape the 
development of global governance by contributing a number of new ideas, institutions, and 
regional/global public goods. By so doing, China is starting to play a more proactive role in the 
making of a new historical bloc (an emerging global governance structure) co-shaped by the 
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established and emerging powers compared to the old historical bloc (the Western-dominated 
global governance structure). China’s role in global governance is experiencing a transition from 
a “system vindicator” to that of a “system reshaper”. 
Conclusion: A New World Order in the Making? 
This paper has provided a historical and holistic interpretation of the historical dynamics between 
China and the world order over the past six and half decades through the lens of 
international/global governance. According to neo-Gramscian IR theory, it attempts to place the 
relationship between China and the world order within a dynamic movement rather than a static 
analytical framework in a certain historical background, as realism and liberalism would suggest. 
This approach can lead to a more holistic understanding of China’s dynamic role in global 
governance/world order from past to present. 
In each historical period, inspired by the neo-Gramscian school, the paper argued that the 
dynamic interactions between material capabilities, ideas, and institutions constructed the causes 
and consequences of China’s strategic choices in international/global governance. Moreover, the 
three historical periods are not separated from each other, which means that the consequence of 
one period would be the cause for the other. In other words, China’s strategic choice and its role 
in global governance today have deep roots in past periods. 
After a long isolation from the then international governance during the first period, we suggest 
that China could not achieve its desired economic development (the failure of the Great Leap 
Forward4) and international status (China’s passive position caused by the “Two Fronts” policy) 
by choosing the radical anti-hegemony strategy by means of the war of maneuver which shaped 
China as a “system revisionist”. It forced China to reexamine its foreign policy and accept the 
passive revolution from the United States (Nixon’s visit to China) under the guiding principle of 
“Tao Guang Yang Hui”. From there, China launched its “Reform and Opening-up Policy”, by 

4 The “Great Leap Forward” (⮶恒扪) of the PRC was an economic and social campaign by the 
Communist Party of China from 1958 to 1962. The campaign was led by Chairman Mao Zedong 
and aimed to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a socialist society 
through rapid industrialization and collectivization. However, it is widely considered to have 
caused the Great Chinese Famine. 
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which China was not only recognized by an increasing number of countries politically, but it also 
has, economically, benefitted a lot from its integration into Western-based international/global 
governance. Against that background, it can be said that China has successfully transformed itself 
from a “system revisionist” to a “system vindicator”. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, given 
that the defects of Western-led global governance are becoming more obvious, with the 
revolutionary change of the pattern of global power, China has started to adopt a counter-
hegemony strategy through the war of position guided by the principle of “You Suo Zuo Wei”. As 
a popular phase from Spiderman goes, “with great power comes great responsibility”. In these 
circumstances, China has proposed a number of innovative ideas and a few emerging international 
institutions which aim at reforming/reshaping the architecture of global governance. Thus, it can 
be considered that China is moving from a “system vindicator” to “system reshaper”.  
From the above historical process, one critical point should be noted: as China has been 
closely associated with the existing international system over the last four decades, it also suggests 
that although China has become the second largest economy in the world and has incredible 
material capabilities, it has no reason or intention to thoroughly overthrow the existing world order, 
which is not accordance with China’s national interest. As Chinese President Xi Jinping argues, 
“China is a participant, builder and contributor to the current international system … we want to 
continue to be the participant, facilitator, and leader of the global governance change process” 
(Xinhua, 2016). 
Last but not least, by placing the rising China and its “You Suo Zuo Wei” strategy within the 
context of the “Three World Order” (world disorder, world re-order, and world new order) 
developed by Christensen and Li (2016), this paper has produced the following arguments, (1) as 
the largest emerging power, China is undoubtedly involved with and is even play a leading role in 
the making of a new world order; (2) this new world order must not be a “world disorder”, which 
indicates the confrontations and clashes between existing powers and emerging powers, since this 
situation is not in the interest of any country in the era of interdependence and globalization; and 
(3) the new world order in the making may be seen as in-between the “world re-order” and “world 
new order”; the former implies that “the existing order is trying to accommodate the new rising 
powers, and the essential features of the existing order are expected to be maintained” (2016: 5), 
and the latter suggests “the existing and emerging powers will negotiate on new terms of 
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relationship shaped by new norms, rules and ideas, leading to redefined new world order” 
(Christensen & Li, 2016: 4). 
The argument “world re-order” is kind of conservative, underestimating the possibility and 
capabilities of China in shaping the rules of game; on the contrary, the argument of a “world new 
order” is sort of radical, overestimating China’s intention and capacity to change the world order. 
Therefore, based on these understandings, it is reasonable to conclude that China is currently 
serving as a proactive rule-shaper rather than a disruptive revisionist or a stubborn vindicator of 
the existing world order. However, it is necessary to mention that China’s role of rule-shaper is 
still in its early stages, as past experience shows. It still needs to be tested by a long historical 
process. How the relationship between China and the world order will develop in the long run still 
depends on a number of predictable and unpredictable factors.  
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